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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
The Order of the Eighth District Court granting Defendants'/Appellees' Motion 
for Summary Judgment and awarding judgment was entered September 25, 2006. See 
Addendum 1, Minute Entry also R. 145. Plaintiffs/Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal 
on October 20, 2006. R. 147. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2-2(3)(j) and (4). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in entering summary judgment where the only 
evidence before it was that the Appellee injured the Appellant, Mrs. Harper, through a 
continuing course of negligent treatment, and where accepting the fact of that negligent 
course of treatment, as required, the claim for negligence was not barred by the statute of 
limitations? 
On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the Court of Appeals reviews 
for correctness, granting no deference to the trial court. Ford v. American Express Fin. 
Advisors, 2004 UT 70, \ 21, 98 P.3d 15. 
Regarding this issue in proceedings before the trial court, the Appellants 
presented evidence in the form of affidavits and the issue of continuing negligent treatment 
was fully briefed. R. 99 - 103; 111-14; 116. 
2. Did the trial court err in granting the motion for summary judgment, where 
disputed issues of material fact existed as to the date of discovery of Appellants' legal injury, 
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which, if resolved in Appellants' favor, would have established the expiration of the statute 
of limitations more than seven months after the date of filing? 
On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the Court of Appeals reviews 
for correctness, granting no deference to the trial court. Ford v. American Express Fin. 
Advisors, 2004 UT 70, f 21, 98 P.3d 15. 
The issue of when Appellants discovered their legal injury was fully briefed 
below and an affidavit was provided. R. 92 - 99; 111 - 114. 
3. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment, where, even accepting 
the date of accrual of the action propounded by the Appellees, interpreting the provisions of 
the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, the cause of action for negligence was filed more than 
one week early? 
On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the Court of Appeals reviews 
for correctness, granting no deference to the trial court. Ford v. American Express Fin. 
Advisors, 2004 UT 70, f 21, 98 P.3d 15. 
The issue of interpretation of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act was fully 
briefed and argued in proceedings before the trial court. R. 107; 165. 
APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following State of Utah statutory provisions are relevant to the disposition 
of this appeal: 
Utah Code § 78-14-4(1) (see Addendum 2). 
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought 
unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, 
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or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, 
whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the alleged 
act, omission, neglect or occurrence, except that: 
Utah Code § 78-14-8 (see Addendum 3)-
Utah Code § 78-14-12 (3)(a) (see Addendum 4). 
(3) (a) The filing of a request for prelitigation panel review under this 
section tolls the applicable statute of limitations until the earlier of 60 days 
following the division's issuance of an opinion by the prelitigation panel, or 
60 days following the termination of jurisdiction by the division as provided 
in this subsection. The division shall send any opinion issued by the panel to 
all parties by regular mail. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Mrs. Harper was a patient who received obstetric/gynecological 
treatment from the Appellees at their clinic in Roosevelt, Utah. Subsequent to a bladder 
operation and hysterectomy in November 2002, Appellants contend that Appellees provided 
inadequate and substandard postoperative care which resulted in Mrs. Harper losing her 
urinary function. Appellants served a notice of intent to commence the action and requested 
a prelitigation hearing pursuant to the requirements of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. 
On January 17, 2006, Appellants filed their Complaint with the Utah Eighth District Court, 
Duchesne County. R. 1 - 6. On March 9, 2006, Appellees filed their Answer. R. 16. 
On June 6, 2006, Appellees moved for summary judgment, alleging that the 
statute of limitations barred the claim. R. 26. Appellants filed a Memorandum in Opposition 
on July 12,2006. R.91 -127. Oral argument was held on September 25,2006, and the Court 
ruled from the bench granting Appellees' motion. R. 165. A "Minutes of Oral Argument" 
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was executed by the Court on September 25, 2006 (R. 145 - 46) and Appellants filed their 
Notice of Appeal on October 20, 2006. R. 147. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. On January 17, 2006, Appellants filed a Complaint against Keith H. 
Evans, M.D. (hereinafter "Appellee Evans"), and Uintah Basin Women's Health, alleging 
a cause of action for medical malpractice. R. 28. In their Complaint, Appellants pleaded, 
generally, cause of action for negligence. More precisely, Appellants alleged that the 
Appellees had breached the applicable standard of care "in multiple respects which caused 
serious and permanent injury to the Plaintiffs . . . . " Exhibit A, Defendants' Memorandum 
in Support, R. 42. 
2. Appellants filed an Amended Complaint on February 1,2006. Exhibit 
B, Defendants' Memorandum in Support, R. 50. 
3. In the fall of 2002, Mrs. Harper presented to Dr. Evans for consultation 
and evaluation of several health issues including excessive bleeding and cramping that she 
had been experiencing during her menstrual cycle. R. 28. 
4. On November 15, 2002, Dr. Evans and Dr. White performed a total 
abdominal hysterectomy and a Marshall-Marchetti (a procedure to surgically reinforce the 
bladder neck to prevent urinary incontinence or unintentional urinary loss). R. 28. 
5. Following her surgery, Mrs. Harper experienced lower quadrant pain 
radiating to her left flank. R. 28. 
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6. In order to address Mrs. Harper's lower quadrant pain, an intravenous 
pyelogram (IVP) was performed, which revealed a blockage of her left ureter. R. 28. On 
November 16,2002, Appellee Evans performed a laparotomy and removed two sutures from 
Mrs. Harper's left ureter. R. 29. 
7. On November 4,2004, Appellants served Notice of Intent to Commence 
Malpractice Action with the Department of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
(hereinafter "DOPL"), and served the same upon the Appellants. R. 29. 
8. On November 4,2004, Appellants also filed a Request for Prelitigation 
Panel Review with DOPL. R. 29. 
9. A prelitigation panel hearing was convened on July 7,2005. R. 30. On 
July 18, 2005, DOPL issued a certificate of compliance to the Appellants. R. 30. 
10. On November 16,2004, exactly two years had elapsed since Dr. Evans 
operated on Mrs. Harper to remove two sutures from her ureter. R. 30. 
11. As of Friday, January 13, 2006, exactly 183 days had passed since 
DOPL issued its Panel Opinion. R. 30. 
12. On March 9, 2006, Defendants filed an Answer to Appellants' 
Complaint asserting inter alia that Plaintiffs' action was barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations. R. 30. 
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13. Dr. Bruce A. Rosenzweig, a Uro-Gynecologist in practice at Rush 
University in Chicago, Illinois has reviewed Mrs. Harper's medical records and provided an 
affidavit critical of Appellee Evans' care.1 R. 94. 
14. During office visits on November 25, 2002; December 2, 2002; 
December 16,2002; January 4,2003; February 25,2003; March 19, 2003; March 24, 2003; 
and April 7, 2003; Appellee Evans failed to diagnose and appropriately treat Mrs. Harper's 
urinary retention. R. 94. 
15. The continual volume of retained urine in Mrs. Harper's bladder 
gradually caused her to lose urinary function. During the period of time from late November 
2002 through early April 2003, Mrs. Harper suffered ongoing injury to her bladder which 
resulted in nearly complete loss of normal urinary function. More likely than not, Appellee 
Evans' failure to treat the ongoing urinary retention over a period of months caused Mrs. 
Harper to lose bladder function and necessitated her ongoing need to use a catheter to void 
her bladder. R. 95. 
16. The standard of care for a gynecologist required that Appellee Evans 
perform testing and bladder studies to determine if Mrs. Harper was having urinary retention 
and to prescribe a catheter until the retention problem resolved. Dr. Evans neglected to 
provide this care to Mrs. Harper until April 14,2003 - five months after the surgery. R. 95. 
appellees never contested or otherwise disputed Dr. Rosenzweig's conclusions or 
testimony for the purposes of the Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 129-30. 
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17. Appellee Evans did not breach the standard of care by suturing around 
the ureter during the hysterectomy performed on November 15, 2002. Dr. Evans complied 
with the standard of care in handling the surgical complication and provided appropriate 
follow-up care. R. 95. 
STATEMENT OF DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
1. On October 23,2002, Mrs. Harper consulted Appellee Evans for cramping 
in her pelvis that was not during her menstruation. After examining her, he told her that she 
needed a hysterectomy and a bladder suspension operation to make sure that she did not have 
problems with urinary incontinence. He offered this as the only alternative for her symptoms 
and told her that she needed the hysterectomy because she had a fibroid tumor which could 
be cancerous. Relying on this advice, she allowed him to schedule the surgery.2 R. 92. 
2. On November 16, 2002, one day after the hysterectomy and bladder 
suspension, Appellee Evans operated on Mrs. Harper again. During the operation, he 
removed sutures around her ureter, took out her appendix, and removed her left ovary. He 
also told her that he "took down" or undid the Marshall-Marchetti operation. R. 92. 
2A11 "Disputed Material Facts" arose from an affidavit by Mrs. Harper which was 
attached to Appellants' Memorandum in Opposition. Since Defendants/Appellee's had relied 
exclusively on the pleadings for their facts, Appellants termed them "Additional Undisputed 
Facts" in their Memorandum in Opposition. However, in their Reply Memorandum, 
Appellees disputed all "Additional Undisputed Facts" that were asserted in Mrs. Harper's 
affidavit. R. 129. Accordingly, these factual issues are designated "Disputed Material Facts" 
for the purposes of this Appeal. 
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3. During the days and weeks following the two operations, Mrs. Harper had 
severe difficulty urinating and suffered chronic pelvic pain. She repeatedly informed 
Appellee Evans of her inability to urinate. She had follow-up visits with him on November 
25, 2002; December 2, 2002; December 16, 2002; January 4, 2003; February 25, 2003; 
March 19, 2003; and March 24, 2003. On each of these visits, Mrs. Harper told Appellee 
Evans of her difficulty in urinating. Every time, he told her that it would get better over time 
without any other treatment. Finally, on April 7,2003, Appellee Evans told Mrs. Harper that 
she had 400 cc in volume of residual urine after voiding. This was the first time Appellee 
had informed her that she had urine retention. R. 93. 
4. On April 14,2003, Appellee Evans determined that Mrs. Harper's residual 
urine after voiding on that day was 200 cc. Appellee Evans then told her that she may need 
to start using a catheter to drain her bladder after voiding. R. 93. 
5. On April 22, 2003, Appellee Evans referred Mrs. Harper to Dr. Peggy 
Norton at the University of Utah Hospital for a consultation regarding her bladder problems. 
By that time, Mrs. Harper was consistently using a catheter on her own because her bladder 
would not function and void properly. R. 93. 
6. On May 12, 2003, Mrs. Harper consulted Peggy Norton, M.D. Defendant 
Evans wrote a letter to Dr. Norton explaining that Mrs. Harper had suffered from chronic 
pelvic pain and urinary function problems since the hysterectomy. The letter also notes that 
Dr. Evans did not give Mrs. Harper a catheter until just a week prior to the letter. After Dr. 
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Norton's office performed tests and examinations, Dr. Norton told Mrs. Harper that she had 
nerve damage to her bladder. R. 93. 
7. On September 16, 2003, Mrs. Harper was referred to Colleen Lowe who 
performed bladder function tests and concluded that over the months that Appellee Evans 
had treated her, that her bladder had become distended due to retained urine. Nurse Lowe 
informed Mrs. Harper that by the time she went to the University of Utah Hospital, her 
bladder had become so damaged that it would likely never regain normal function. Mrs. 
Harper was told that if she had received appropriate therapy from the time of her 
hysterectomy and bladder suspension, that the chance of full recovery would have been very 
good. R. 93 - 94. 
8. Mrs. Harper continues to use a catheter to empty her bladder at least 4 times 
a day. If she tries to urinate normally, she can only partially void and she suffers excruciating 
pain. Mrs. Harper always needs to use a catheter to completely empty her bladder. She has 
been told by other medical providers that Appellee Evans' failure to treat her appropriately 
or to refer her to a specialist for 5 months was the cause of her loss of urinary function. She 
has been told by several providers that if she had been treated appropriately on the follow-up 
visits that she would likely have full urinary function. R. 94. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. 
Appellants presented uncontested evidence of Appellee Evans' continuing 
negligent treatment lasting approximately 5 months after the date the Appellees claim the 
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action accrued. Under the continuing negligent treatment rule, as set forth in Peteler v. 
Robison, 17 P.2d 244 (Utah 1932), the date of accrual of the action would not have been until 
the last date of negligent treatment or on April 7, 2003. If that date is used as the date of 
accrual of the action, the statute of limitations would not have expired until nearly one month 
after the original Complaint was filed and more than two weeks after the filing of the 
Amended Complaint. Summary judgment was inappropriate because all of the evidence in 
the record, which was not disputed by the Appellees, is that Appellees' negligence was a 
continuing course of conduct extending over a period of months. The action was, therefore, 
timely filed and judgment below should be reversed and the case remanded for further 
proceedings. 
POINT II. 
Summary judgment was inappropriate, because an issue of material fact existed 
as to the date that Appellants discovered their legal injury. Mrs. Harper has presented her 
affidavit indicating that she only discovered that the continuing post-operative treatment was 
the cause of her loss of urinary function in September, 2003 when another health care 
provider told her that her urinary problems could have been prevented had she received 
adequate post-operative care and testing. Appellees made a general denial of these facts 
whereby an issue of material fact arose as to when Appellants discovered or should have 
discovered their legal injury. If the trier of fact decides that Appellants did not discover their 
legal injury until September 2003, then the action did not become time barred until July 23, 
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2006 - more than 7 months after the original Complaint was filed. The district court, 
therefore, erred in granting summary judgment in the face of this evidence. Summary 
judgment should be reversed and the case remanded for discovery and trial. 
POINT III. 
Even assuming that Appellants should have discovered their legal injury on the 
date of surgery in November 2002, the statute of limitations did not expire as a matter of law 
until January 26,2006, some nine days after the filing of the Complaint. The Utah legislature 
has allowed for tolling of the statute of limitations while medical malpractice actions under 
administrative review plus a period of 60 days and for an automatic 120 extension of the time 
to file when the physician is given notice less than 90 days from the expiration of the statute. 
Accounting for both of these periods which are applicable in this case, the Court should rule 
that the original Complaint was timely filed, reverse the order granting judgment below, and 
remand for further proceedings. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS IMPROPER BECAUSE THE CLAIM FOR 
NEGLIGENCE DID NOT ACCRUE UNTIL APRIL 7,2003 WHEN DR. 
EVANS LAST NEGLIGENTLY TREATED MS. HARPER. 
Relying on facts not disputed by the Appellees, the date of accrual of the 
negligence claim was the last date of negligent treatment or April 7,2003. Because the cause 
of action did not accrue until that date, the Complaint was timely filed and summary 
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judgment must be denied. In their Memorandum in Opposition, Plaintiffs produced an 
affidavit from a qualified expert who testified that Appellee Evans negligently treated Mrs. 
Harper over a period of about 5 months. This evidence was not disputed by the Appellees. 
Summary judgment must, therefore, be denied. A district court's grant of summary judgment 
is reviewed for correctness, affording no deference to the district court. Ford v. American 
Express Fin. Advisors, 2004 UT 70, f 21, 98 P.3d 15. Summary judgment is inappropriate 
where the evidence presents a genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in favor of 
the nonmoving party, would entitle him to judgment as a matter of law. Jackson v. Dabney, 
645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). 
A, The Continuing Negligent Treatment Rule. 
Where a patient is injured by a course of continuing negligent treatment, the 
cause of action does not accrue until the date of the final negligent act. In Peteler v. 
Robison, 17 P.2d 244 (Utah 1932), the Utah Supreme Court ruled that where a physician 
provides continuing negligent treatment, the statute of limitations does not commence until 
the last date of negligent treatment. In that case, the defendant doctor had performed an 
allegedly unnecessary tonsillectomy on the plaintiff. Id. at 245. The defendant continued 
to treat the plaintiff even after she contracted a post-operative infection. Id. The plaintiff 
alleged that the defendant not only provided an unnecessary operation, but that the continuing 
post-operative care was also negligent. Id. When the plaintiff brought suit more than four 
years after the tonsillectomy but before the four year anniversary of the last date of treatment, 
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the defendant moved for dismissal, claiming that the complaint was untimely filed. Id. at 
246. The trial court agreed with the defendant and dismissed the complaint. Id. 
On appeal, the supreme court reversed, holding that where the tort is a 
continuing course of action, the claim for negligence does not accrue until the last negligent 
act was committed. Id. at 247 ('The tort was a continuing one, and, where the tort is 
continuing the right of action is also continuing . . . ." Id.). Known as the "continuing 
negligent treatment rule," this principle continues to be the law in Utah. Most recently, the 
Utah Supreme Court cited the rule with approval in Collins v. Wilson, 1999 UT 56, nt. 9,984 
P.2d 960, (1999) ("The entire negligent course of treatment constitutes a single cause of 
action and, as such, the statute of limitations would not begin to run until the completion of 
the act giving rise to the cause of action, i.e. the negligent course of treatment." Id.) see also, 
Schuurman v. Shingleton, 2001 UT 52 f 20,26 P.3d 227,232 (quoting footnote 9 of Collins 
v. Wilson). 
B. Summary Judgment Is Improper Where There Is an Issue of Fact as 
to the Date of Accrual of the Action. 
Summary judgment is inappropriate where the plaintiff brings forth admissible 
evidence which raises a contested issue of material fact which must be decided by the trier 
of fact. Browerv. Brown, 744 P.2d 1337, 1339 (Utah 1987). 
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C. An Issue of Fact Exists as to Appellees' Continuing Negligent 
Treatment. 
As part of their Memorandum in Opposition, Plaintiffs filed the affidavit of 
an expert physician who testified that the breach of the standard of care in the case was the 
negligent course of treatment by Defendant Evans over the period of November 2002 to 
April 2003. Dr. Bruce A. Rosenzweig also opined that there was no breach of the standard 
of care during the two operations performed by Appellee Evans. R. 94 -95,116. Appellees 
only cited the pleadings, arguing that Appellants have alleged negligence by the doctors in 
performing the surgeries. However, Appellants have not claimed that the surgeries were 
performed negligently in any of their pleadings below. There is no evidence in the record 
that Dr. Evans breached the standard of care during either of the two operations. To the 
contrary, the only evidence is from Appellants' expert witness who testified that the doctors 
did not breach the standard of care during the surgeries. R. 95. 
This Court must, therefore, rule that there was no breach of the standard of care 
by the Appellees in suturing the ureter or at any other time during the initial hysterectomy or 
the repair operation a day later. Mrs. Harper's claim for malpractice did not accrue until 
April 7,2003 when Appellee Evans last negligently failed to properly treat Mrs. Harper. See 
"Statement of Undisputed Facts" supra \ f 14 -16. 
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D. The Complaint Was Timely Filed Because the Claim Did Not Accrue 
Until April 7,2003 - Approximately Five Months After the Surgeries. 
With April 7,2003 established as the date of accrual, the Complaint was timely 
filed on January 13, 2006. The following dates are determinative: 
April 7, 2003 Date of Last Negligent Treatment 
November 4,2004 Serviceof the Notice of Intent (U.C. A. § 78-14-8) 
November 4, 2004 Filing of Request for Prelitigation Review 
April 7, 2005 Two year anniversary of last negligent treatment 
September 15, 2005 Statute of Limitations ceased to be tolled 
January 13, 2006 Complaint is filed 
February 1, 2006 Amended Complaint is filed 
February 15, 2006 Statute of Limitations expired 
Accepting, for the purposes of this appeal, that the last date of negligence and the accrual of 
the negligence action was on April 7,2003, the statute of limitations could not expire before 
April 7, 2005. Because the Request for Prelitigation Panel Review as filed on November 4, 
2004, the time from that date to April 7, 2005 (154 days) is added to September 15, 2005 
(when the DOPL jurisdiction ended) U.C.A. § 78-14-12(a)(3). The result is that considering 
the date of accrual alone and adding three days for mailing, the statute of limitations did not 
expire until February 15, 2006, more than a month after filing of the Complaint and two 
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weeks following the filing of the Amended Complaint. Summary judgment by the trial court 
must, therefore, be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. 
POINT II 
AN ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTS AS TO WHEN MRS. 
HARPER DISCOVERED HER LEGAL INJURY. THEREFORE, 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS INAPPROPRIATE. 
Summary judgment is inappropriate because Mrs. Harper did not discover her 
legal injury until 10 months after her second surgery. With their Memorandum in 
Opposition, Appellants filed Mrs. Harper's affidavit, in which she testified that she only 
discovered that her continuing urinary problems were the result of negligent treatment when 
she consulted another medical provider on September 16, 2003. Appellees made a general 
denial of the affidavit in their Reply Memorandum without offering contradictory evidence. 
R. 129. As a result, an issue of material fact exists as to when Mrs. Harper discovered or 
should have discovered her legal injury. On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the 
Court of Appeals reviews for correctness, granting no deference to the trial court. Ford v. 
American Express Fin. Advisors, 2004 UT 70, f 21,98 P.3d 15. Where the date of discovery 
of one's legal injury is unclear, the defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Browerv. Brown, 744 P.2d 1337, 1339 (Utah 1987). 
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A. The Statute of Limitations Does Not Commence Until the Patient 
Discovers Her Legal Injury. 
An issue of material fact exists as to when Mrs. Harper discovered her legal 
injury Consequently, the trier of fact must determine when Mrs. Harper should have 
discovered her injury. However, the only evidence in the record is that the statute of 
limitations did not commence until Mrs. Harper discovered she had suffered a legal injury 
on September 16,2003. A medical malpractice action must be commenced within two years 
of the time that the patient discovers or should discover she has been injured by negligence. 
Section 78-14-4, Utah Code Annotated, reads in pertinent part as follows: 
No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought unless it 
is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or 
through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, 
whichever first occurs,.. . . 
U.C.A. § 78-14-4(1). In interpreting this provision, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that 
the two-year limitations period "does not commence to run until the injured person knew or 
should have known that he had sustained an injury and that the injury was caused by 
negligent action." Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1979). In Foil, the court was 
asked to interpret U.C.A. § 78-14-4 with regard to when a plaintiff discovers the injury for 
which she complains. It ruled that a plaintiff only discovers the "injury" when she discovers 
her legal injury or that she has sustained a bodily injury and "that the injury was caused by 
negligent action." Id. at 148. In subsequent cases, the supreme court has ruled that patients 
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cannot be expected to divine that they have been injured by negligence merely because they 
have complications from treatment. 
Patients without medical training do not typically understand complex medical 
issues and so the discovery of legal injury cannot be a simple knowledge of bodily injury 
alone. The court recognized that due to the highly complex nature of medical treatment, 
untrained patients often cannot know when an injury or complication is a natural 
consequence, as opposed to, an injury attributable to negligence. The court in the Foil case 
noted that patients are at a disadvantage when determining whether they have been injured 
by negligence. 
In the health care field it is typically the case that there often is a great 
disparity in the knowledge of those who provide health care services and those 
who receive the services with respect to expected and unexpected side effects 
of a given procedure, as well as the nature, degree, and extent of expected after 
effects. While the recipient may be aware of a disability or dysfunction, there 
may be, to the untutored understanding of the average layman, no apparent 
connection between the treatment provided by a physician and the injury 
suffered. Even if there is, it may be passed off as an unavoidable side effect 
or side effect that will pass with time. Indeed, common experience teaches 
that one often suffers pain and other physical difficulties without knowing or 
suspecting the true cause, and may, as often happens, ascribe a totally 
erroneous cause to the manifestations. 
Id. at 147. Injured patients are not expected to know or understand complex medical issues 
including a less than obvious connection between the treatment and the legal injury. To 
require an untrained patient to diagnose the cause of her symptoms and determine that they 
come from negligence works an injustice which requires the interpretation of the term 
"injury" in § 78-14-4 as legal injury. Legal injury must include not only knowledge of a 
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bodily injury, but an understanding that the injury resulted from negligence. Id. at 148. 
When a plaintiff offers admissible evidence that she did not and could not have discovered 
the legal injury, an issue of fact is raised which precludes summary judgment. Andreini v. 
Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916,919 (Utah 1993). In determining whether an action was timely filed, 
where the evidence conflicts as to when the plaintiff should have discovered her injury, a 
"classic factual dispute" arises which must be determined by the trier of fact. Id. In such 
circumstances, summary judgment is improper. Id. at 923 (holding summary judgment must 
be reversed and remanded where the evidence conflicted on when the plaintiff should have 
discovered his legal injury). 
In Brower v. Brown, 744 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court 
determined that where uncertainty exists as to whether the plaintiff discovered or should have 
discovered her injury as a matter of law, summary judgment is improper. In that case, the 
plaintiff underwent a hysterectomy performed by the defendant doctor. Id. at 1338. During 
the procedure, she suffered a puncture wound to her thigh and suffered chronic pain and 
other problems thereafter. Id. About 9 months after the surgery, the plaintiff was 
hospitalized for a blood clot at the site of the puncture wound. Id. While in the hospital, a 
care provider told her that the puncture wound and her complications were the result of the 
defendants' negligence in performing the operation. Id. 
The plaintiff filed suit and defendants move for summary judgment, claiming 
that the action was time barred by the statute. Id. Plaintiff countered with an affidavit 
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acknowledging that she knew of the physical injuries she had suffered, but that until her 
hospitalization she did not know, nor could she have known that the injuries were the result 
of negligence by the defendants. Id. at 1339. The trial court granted summary judgment and 
the plaintiff appealed. Id. at 1338. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that a genuine 
issue of material fact existed: specifically as to when the plaintiff should have known of her 
legal injury for the purposes of commencing the statute of limitations. Id. at 1339. This 
issue of fact made summary judgment inappropriate and the case was reversed and remanded. 
Id. 
B. There Are Disputed Issues of Fact as to When Mrs. Harper Discovered 
Her Legal Injury Make Summary Judgment Inappropriate. 
Mrs. Harper has brought forward testimony in the form of her affidavit where 
she testifies that she did not discovery that her urinary problems were likely due to Appellee 
Evans' negligence until September 16, 2003. R. 92-94, 111-14. Without elaboration, 
Appellees made a general denial of her affidavit and the attending facts set out in the 
Memorandum in Opposition. R. 129. However, as Dr. Rosenzweig's affidavit establishes, 
it is uncontested that Mrs. Harper suffered from residual urine retention in her bladder for 
at least five months. See "Statement of Undisputed Facts" supra f 14. During this time, she 
consistently sought treatment from Defendant Evans who failed to provide the appropriate 
treatment. Id. Defendant Evans breached the standard of care by failing to order appropriate 
testing or to place a catheter to relieve the excess volumes. . See "Statement of Undisputed 
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Facts" supra f 16. Over time, as the residual volumes went untreated, her bladder became 
distended and dysfunctional. See "Statement of Undisputed Facts" supra f 15. It was the 
delay and ongoing negligence that caused Mrs. Harper's loss of urinary function. Id. 
Under Appellants' facts as laid out in Mrs. Harper's affidavit, and which must 
be accepted for the purposes of this appeal, she did not discover that her continual urinary 
problems could be the result of negligence until informed by Colleen Lowe, a specialist at 
the University of Utah, on September 16,2003. See "Statement of Disputed Material Facts" 
supra f 7. Nurse Lowe told Mrs. Harper that she likely had permanent bladder damage, that 
she would probably have permanent impairment to her urinary function, and that the 
permanent injury occurred because of the delay in treating the condition. R. 94. This was 
the first time that Mrs. Harper discovered or even could have known about the permanent 
impairment to her urinary function and that it was because of Dr. Evans' negligence. Under 
Section 78-14-4 as interpreted in Foil and reemphasized in Brower, the statute of limitations 
did not commence until September 16, 2003. 
C. Due to the Disputed Issues of Material Fact, the Issue of When Mrs. 
Harper Should Have Discovered Her Injury Is for the Trier of Fact. 
Since the two-year statute of limitations commenced when Mrs. Harper 
discovered her legal injury on September 16, 2003, under Section 78-14-4, the two-year 
limitations period would have expired on September 16, 2005. However, because Mrs. 
Harper filed her Request for Prelitigation Panel Review on November 4,2004, the limitations 
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period was tolled from November 4, 2004 until September 15, 2005 a period of 310 days. 
U.C.A. § 78-14- 12(3)(a). The statute of limitations would have begun to run on September 
16,2005 ~ the two year anniversary of the date of discovery. Adding 310 days to September 
16, 2005 would mean that the statute of limitations did not expire until July 23, 2006. This 
was approximately 7 months after the filing of the Complaint. 
In the proceedings before the trial court, the Defendants contended that the 
breach of the standard of care which caused Mrs. Harper's damages was the suturing around 
the ureter during the initial hysterectomy. However, the Appellants have not pleaded the 
surgical complication as negligence and there is no evidence in the record to support this 
contention. To the contrary, the only evidence in the record is that there was no breach of 
the standard of care during the surgical procedures. See "Undisputed Facts" supra f 17. 
Accepting, as it must, the fact that Mrs. Harper did not learn until September 
16,2003 that she had been injured and that the injury was result of Dr. Evans negligence, the 
Court must reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. 
POINT III 
EVEN IF THE DATE OF THE HYSTERECTOMY IS ACCEPTED AS 
THE DATE OF ACCRUAL AND DISCOVERY, THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS HAD NOT EXPIRED BEFORE THE COMPLAINT 
WAS FILED. 
In the alternative, even accepting the accrual date as November 16, 2002 and 
that Mrs. Harper discovered her legal injury on that date, the Complaint was timely filed on 
January 13, 2006. For patients filing medical malpractice actions, the Utah Legislature has 
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provided for an automatic 120 day extension, when the required Notice of Intent is served 
within 90 days of the two year anniversary of the date of injury. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8. 
The statute of limitations is also tolled for the time it takes to complete the prelitigation 
administrative process plus an additional time of 60 days. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3)(a). 
In section 78-14-8, which was passed in 1976, the legislature designated an automatic 120 
day extension of the statute of limitations where the required Notice of Intent is served on 
the respondents within 90 days of the expiration of the statute.3 (Laws 1976, c. 23, § 8). By 
its plain terms, the 120 days is an unconditional extension. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8. Nine 
years later, in 1985, the legislature established the prelitigation panel administrative process 
requiring all plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions to go through a mandatory 
378-14-8. Notice of Intent to Commence Action. 
No malpractice action against a health care provider may be initiated unless and until the plaintiff 
gives the prospective defendant or his executor or successor, at least ninety days' prior notice of 
intent to commence an action. Such notice shall include a general statement of the nature of the 
claim, the persons involved, the date, time and place of the occurrence, the circumstances thereof, 
specific allegations of misconduct on the part of the prospective defendant, the nature of the alleged 
injuries and other damages sustained. Notice may be in letter or affidavit form executed by the 
plaintiff or his attorney. Service shall be accomplished by persons authorized and in the manner 
prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of the summons and complaint in a 
civil action or by certified mail, return receipt requested, in which case notice shall be deemed to 
have been served on the date of mailing. Such notice shall be served within the time allowed for 
commencing a malpractice action against a health care provider. If the notice is served less than 
ninety days prior to the expiration of the applicable time period, the time for commencing the 
malpractice action against the health care provider shall be extended to 120 days from the date of 
service of notice. 
This section shall, for purposes of determining its retroactivity, not be construed as relating to the 
limitation on the time for commencing any action, and shall apply only to causes of action arising 
on or after April 1, 1976. This section shall not apply to third party actions, counterclaims or 
crossclaims against a health care provider. 
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administrative hearing process where the case is reviewed by a prelitigation panel. Laws 
1985, c. 238, § 1. The legislature also provided a tolling provision for the period of time 
while the case was under the administrative process extending 60 days after issuance of the 
opinion by the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing. Laws 1994, c. 171, § 
2, encoded at Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 (3). By adding this administrative requirement 
without altering the automatic extension granted in the Notice of Intent provision (U.C.A. 
§ 78-14-8) the legislature has signaled that it approves of both measures where applicable. 
If it had meant to abrogate the 120 day extension with the tolling provision, it would have 
done so. Accordingly, in Utah, the statute of limitations is tolled from the time of the filing 
of the Request for Prelitigation Panel Review until 60 days after the issuance of the panel 
opinion and where the Notice of Intent is served 90 days or less before the expiration of the 
statute, the time to file is extended 120 days. 
In the case at hand, even assuming, as Appellees set forth below, that the date 
of accrual was November 17,2002, the cause of action would have expired on November 17, 
2004. Mrs. Harper filed her Request for Prelitigation Panel Review on November 4,2004 --
13 days before the statute expired. Further, by the tolling provision of § 78-14-12(3), the 
days after Mrs. Harper's filing of the Request but which preceded the expiration of the statute 
are not counted as part of the statute. If the tolling under § 78-14-12(3) ceased on September 
15, 2005 and adding 120 days pursuant to § 78-14-8, plus three days for mailing (Utah 
Admin. Code R156-78A-14(3) (2005), and the 13 days tolled before the expiration of the 
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statute (a total of 136 days from September 15,2005), the time to file the Complaint would 
have been January 26, 2006. By any calculation consistent with the statutes, the case was 
filed in a timely manner and the order below must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
By finding that issues of material fact exist as to Appellees' continuing 
negligent treatment or as to Appellants' discovery of their legal injury, the Court should 
reverse the trial court's award of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. 
As the Court finds that the interpretation of Utah Code Annotated sections 78-14-8 and 78-
14-12(3)(a) favors the Appellants, it should rule as a matter of law that the action was timely 
filed, reverse the order below, and remand for jury trial. 
DATED AND SUBMITTED this 26th day of February, 2007. 
Cory R-Mattson, Attorney for Appellants 
ADDENDUM 
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Addendum 1 
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Addendum 2 
78-14-4. Statute of limitations -- Exceptions -- Application. 
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought 
unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient 
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered 
the injury, whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date 
of the alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence, except that: 
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health care provider is 
that a foreign object has been wrongfully left within a patient's body, the 
claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or 
patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered, the existence of the foreign object wrongfully left in the patient's 
body, whichever first occurs; and 
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented from 
discovering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because that 
health care provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged 
misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after 
the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence, 
should have discovered the fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs. 
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of 
minority or other legal disability under Section 78-12-36 or any other 
provision of the law, and shall apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships, 
associations and corporations and to all health care providers and to all 
malpractice actions against health care providers based upon alleged personal 
injuries which occurred prior to the effective date of this act; provided, 
however, that any action which under former law could have been 
commenced after the effective date of this act may be commenced only 
within the unelapsed portion of time allowed under former law; but any 
action which under former law could have been commenced more than four 
years after the effective date of this act may be commenced only within four 
years after the effective date of this act. 
Amended by Chapter 128, 1979 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 78J3005.ZIP 2,592 Bytes 
Addendum 3 
78-14-8. Notice of intent to commence action. 
No malpractice action against a health care provider may be initiated 
unless and until the plaintiff gives the prospective defendant or his executor or 
successor, at least ninety days' prior notice of intent to commence an action. 
Such notice shall include a general statement of the nature of the claim, the 
persons involved, the date, time and place of the occurrence, the 
circumstances thereof, specific allegations of misconduct on the part of the 
prospective defendant, the nature of the alleged injuries and other damages 
sustained. Notice may be in letter or affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or 
his attorney. Service shall be accomplished by persons authorized and in the 
manner prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of the 
summons and complaint in a civil action or by certified mail, return receipt 
requested, in which case notice shall be deemed to have been served on the 
date of mailing. Such notice shall be served within the time allowed for 
commencing a malpractice action against a health care provider. If the notice 
is served less than ninety days prior to the expiration of the applicable time 
period, the time for commencing the malpractice action against the health 
care provider shall be extended to 120 days from the date of service of 
notice. 
This section shall, for purposes of determining its retroactivity, not be 
construed as relating to the limitation on the time for commencing any action, 
and shall apply only to causes of action arising on or after April 1, 1976. This 
section shall not apply to third party actions, counterclaims or crossclaims 
against a health care provider. 
Amended by Chapter 128, 1979 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 78.13013.ZIP 2,467 Bytes 
Addendum 4 
78-14-12. Division to provide panel -- Exemption -- Procedures --
Statute of limitations tolled - Composition of panel -- Expenses --
Division authorized to set license fees. 
(1) (a) The division shall provide a hearing panel in alleged medical 
liability cases against health care providers as defined in Section 78-14-3, 
except dentists. 
(b) (i) The division shall establish procedures for prelitigation 
consideration of medical liability claims for damages arising out of the 
provision of or alleged failure to provide health care. 
(ii) The division may establish rules necessary to administer the process 
and procedures related to prelitigation hearings and the conduct of 
prelitigation hearings in accordance with Sections 78-14-12 through 78-14-16. 
(c) The proceedings are informal, nonbinding, and are not subject to Title 
63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, but are compulsory as a 
condition precedent to commencing litigation. 
(d) Proceedings conducted under authority of this section are confidential, 
privileged, and immune from civil process. 
(2) (a) The party initiating a medical liability action shall file a request for 
prelitigation panel review with the division within 60 days after the service of 
a statutory notice of intent to commence action under Section 78-14-8. 
(b) The request shall include a copy of the notice of intent to commence 
action. The request shall be mailed to all health care providers named in the 
notice and request. 
(3) (a) The filing of a request for prelitigation panel review under this 
section tolls the applicable statute of limitations until the earlier of 60 days 
following the division's issuance of an opinion by the prelitigation panel, or 60 
days following the termination of jurisdiction by the division as provided in 
this subsection. The division shall send any opinion issued by the panel to all 
parties by regular mail. 
(b) (i) The division shall complete a prelitigation hearing under this section 
within 180 days after the filing of the request for prelitigation panel review, or 
within any longer period as agreed upon in writing by all parties to the 
review. 
(ii) If the prelitigation hearing has not been completed within the time 
limits established in Subsection (3)(b)(i), the division has no further jurisdiction 
over the matter subject to review and the claimant is considered to have 
complied with all conditions precedent required under this section prior to the 
commencement of litigation. 
(c) (i) The claimant and any respondent may agree by written stipulation 
that no useful purpose would be served by convening a prelitigation panel 
under this section. 
(ii) When the stipulation is filed with the division, the division shall within 
ten days after receipt enter an order divesting itself of jurisdiction over the 
claim, as it concerns the stipulating respondent, and stating that the claimant 
has complied with all conditions precedent to the commencement of litigation 
regarding the claim. 
(4) The division shall provide for and appoint an appropriate panel or 
panels to hear complaints of medical liability and damages, made by or on 
behalf of any patient who is an alleged victim of medical liability. The panels 
are composed of: 
(a) one member who is a resident lawyer currently licensed and in good 
standing to practice law in this state and who shall serve as chairman of the 
panel, who is appointed by the division from among qualified individuals who 
have registered with the division indicating a willingness to serve as panel 
members, and a willingness to comply with the rules of professional conduct 
governing lawyers in the state of Utah, and who has completed division 
training regarding conduct of panel hearings; 
(b) (i) one member who is a licensed health care provider listed under 
Section 78-14-3, who is practicing and knowledgeable in the same specialty as 
the proposed defendant, and who is appointed by the division in accordance 
with Subsection (5); or 
(ii) in claims against only hospitals or their employees, one member who 
is an individual currently serving in a hospital administration position directly 
related to hospital operations or conduct that includes responsibility for the 
area of practice that is the subject of the liability claim, and who is appointed 
by the division; and 
(c) a lay panelist who is not a lawyer, doctor, hospital employee, or other 
health care provider, and who is a responsible citizen of the state, selected and 
appointed by the division from among individuals who have completed 
division training with respect to panel hearings. 
(5) (a) Each person listed as a health care provider in Section 78-14-3 and 
practicing under a license issued by the state, is obligated as a condition of 
holding that license to participate as a member of a medical liability 
prelitigation panel at reasonable times, places, and intervals, upon issuance, 
with advance notice given in a reasonable time frame, by the division of an 
Order to Participate as a Medical Liability Prelitigation Panel Member. 
(b) A licensee may be excused from appearance and participation as a 
panel member upon the division finding participation by the licensee will 
create an unreasonable burden or hardship upon the licensee. 
(c) A licensee whom the division finds failed to appear and participate as 
a panel member when so ordered, without adequate explanation or 
justification and without being excused for cause by the division, may be 
assessed an administrative fine not to exceed $5,000. 
(d) A licensee whom the division finds intentionally or repeatedly failed to 
appear and participate as a panel member when so ordered, without adequate 
explanation or justification and without being excused for cause by the 
division, may be assessed an administrative fine not to exceed $5,000, and is 
guilty of unprofessional conduct. 
(e) All fines collected under Subsections (5)(c) and (d) shall be deposited 
in the Physicians Education Fund created in Section 58-67a-l. 
(6) Each person selected as a panel member shall certify, under oath, that 
he has no bias or conflict of interest with respect to any matter under 
consideration. 
(7) Members of the prelitigation hearing panels shall receive per diem 
compensation and travel expenses for attending panel hearings as established 
by rules of the division. 
(8) (a) In addition to the actual cost of administering the licensure of 
health care providers, the division may set license fees of health care 
providers within the limits established by law equal to their proportionate 
costs of administering prelitigation panels. 
(b) The claimant bears none of the costs of administering the prelitigation 
panel except under Section 78-14-16. 
Amended by Chapter 256, 2002 General Session 
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